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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM 
WHITTAKER, CAROL WHIT~ 
TAKER, and DENISE WHIT-
TAKER by her Guardian Ad 
Litem, William Whittaker, 
P~a:intijjs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH 
-JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and 
NORTH AMERICAN VAN 
LINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8894 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ALVIN UNDERWOOD AND JOSEPH JOHNSON 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY AND DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS; 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This personal injury suit was pre-tried to the 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, on April 5, 1958, and subsequently went 
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to jury trial on the Pretrial Order vvhich read, in 
part, as follows: 
The following matters are not in dispute, 
and no proof will be required at the trial here-
of to establish 'the same : 
1. A collision occurred on the 15th day 
of December, 1956, at about one forty-five 
o'Clock in the morning. 
2. Three tractor-trailers were stopped, 
all facing east, at the scene of the accident. 
3. The easternmost tractor-trailer be-
longed to the North American Van Lines, Inc., 
and was driven by H. E. Woolf, who was an 
employee of North American Van Lines, Inc., 
and was at the time in the course of his em-
ployment. 
4. The middle truck was owned by 
Joseph Johnson and was driven by Alvin Un-
derwood. 
5. The driver of the westernmost truck 
is to the parties unknown a't this thne. 
6. An automobile belonging to and 
driven by William Whittaker stopped behind 
the truck owned by Joseph Johnson. 
7. A pick-up 'truck registered in the 
name of Frontier Sales, Inc., a corporation, 
and given by said corporation into the posses-
sion of Keith M. Olsen was driven easterly 
by Nancy Dillingham, a minor of the age of 
sixteen years at the time, and who had no 
driver's license nor learner's license to drive 
a car. 
8. Keith M. Olsen was in the pick-up 
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truck at the time of the collision and had 
given Nancy Dillingham permission to drive 
said truck. 
9. The truck driven by Nancy Dilling-
ham crashed into the rear of the car owned 
by William Whittaker. 
10. The westernmost truck had stopped 
on the highway because it had been disabled 
in its lighting system, but the repairs had been 
completed and the rear lights were operating 
a't the time of the collision referred to above. 
11. The other two tractor-trailers had 
stopped for the purpose of rendering aid to 
the westernmost tractor-trailer. 
It is the contention of William Whittaker 
and all plaintiffs named in case No. 111502 
that the drivers of each of the tractor-trailers 
were negligent in stopping their vehicles be-
cause they blocked a part of the paved portion 
of the highway and were further negligent 
because they did not have lighted flares set 
out or gave no warning to Nancy Dillingham 
of the fact that they were blocking the high-
way. Said plaintiffs will further contend that 
the drivers of the tractor-trailers were negli-
gent in parking their vehicles so close together 
as to c1·eate a trap. 
It is the further contention of William 
Whittaker and the occupants of his car that 
they suffered damages and injuries because 
of negligence on 'the part of Nancy Dillingham 
in the following particulars : 
(a) She drove at a rate of speed great-
er than was safe, reasonable, and prudent in 
view of all the surrounding circumstances. 
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(b) She failed to keep and maintain 
a proper lookout for other vehicles upon the 
highway and particularly for the vehicle 
owned by William Whittaker. 
(c) She was an unlicensed driver and 
not qualified to operate the vehicle which she 
purported to drive. 
(d) She drove the pick-up truck at a 
time when she was drowsy from fatigue. 
William Whittaker and the occupants of 
his car claim damages as set forth in the com-
plaint filed in case No. 111502. 
It is the contention of North American 
Van Lines, Inc., H. E. Woolf, Joseph Johnson, 
and Alvin Underwood that they were not 
negligent as claimed by William Whittaker 
or at all and that even if they were negligent, 
their negligence, if any, could not be a proxi-
mate cause of any injuries sustained by Wil-
liam Whittaker and the occupants of his car 
or Nancy Dillingham and Keith M. Olsen. 
It is the further contention of Joseph 
Johnson that the truck had been leased to 
Security Foods and that Alvin Underwood at 
the time of the accident was the servant of 
Security Foods and not his agent. 
It is the contention of Keith M. Olsen 
that he received injuries because of negligence 
on the part of Alvin Underwood in parking 
the Johnson truck so as to block traffic on the 
paved portion of the highway and without 
setting out flares or having lights on his truck 
and trailer at the time of the collision. 
It is the further contention of Keith M. 
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Olsen, Nancy Dillingham, and Frontier Sales 
Corporation that Nancy Dillingham was not 
negligent as claimed or at all. 
The Court will hold as a matter of law 
that Keith M. Olsen is chargeable with the 
negligence of Nancy Dillingham and that 
Nancy Dillingham was negligent as a matter 
of law, and for that reason will dismiss the 
action of Keith M. Olsen with prejudice and 
hold that Keith M. Olsen and Nancy Dilling-
ham are liable to the plain tiffs in case No. 
111502. 
The court further finds that there exists the 
following: 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT 
1. Were the defendants Alvin Under-
wood and H. E. Woolf or either of them guilty 
of negligence as charged by plaintiffs in case 
No. 111502? 
2. If so, was such negligence a proxi-
mate cause of the collision? 
3. Was Alvin Underwood an agent, 
servant, and employee and in the course of 
employment with Joseph Johnson at the tin1e 
he parked the Johnson tractor-trailer on the 
highway? 
4. What amount of damages did each of 
the plaintiffs named in case No. 111502 sus-
tain as a proximate result of any negligence 
on behalf of the named defendants? 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF LAW 
1. Are plaintiffs in case No. 111502 
entitled to recover from 1~ orth American Van 
Lines and H. E. Woolf? 
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2. Are said plaintiffs entitled to re~ 
cover from Joseph Johnson and Alvin Under-
wood or either of them? 
3. Are said plaintiffs entitled to recover 
from Frontier Sales, a corporation? 
(R. 34-37). 
As to these respondents and the respondents 
Woolf and North American Van Lines, 'the verdict 
returned was "No Cause of Action." 
Other defendants, the Olsens and Frontier Sales 
Corporation, made an independent settlement just 
prior to trial and were dismissed from the action 
upon mdtion of appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These respondents join with the respondents 
Woolf and North American Van Lines in declining 
to accept appellants' staten1ent of fact and also 
assert that appellants' brief relates only such facts 
as most strongly support their own contentions. We 
adopt the Staternent of Facts of respondents \Yoolf 
and North American Van Lines in its entirety and 
add briefly thereto. 
All vehicles involved were traveling east on 
U. S. 40-50 shortly after one o'clock in the morning. 
There is evidence as 'to five separate motor vehicles; 
they are referred to throughout the record as truck 
units 1, 2, and 3, the Nash automobile and the 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chevrolet pickup. We so refer to each one in this 
brief. 
Unit No. 1 had difficulty with its headlights 
and pulled off to the south extremity of the high-
way, partially on and partially off the paved sur-
face. Unit No. 2 passed Unit No. 1 and also pulled 
up on the south side of the road 150 to 175 feet in 
front of No. 1 (R. 221); Unit No. 3 passed both 
No. 1 and No. 2 and also stopped on the southerly 
side of the road about the same distance ( 150 to 
175 feet) in front of No. 2. Thus the parked trucks 
were lined up - not, as appellants say (Appellants' 
Brief, page 5) as a "solid wall of trucks." 
Your appellant, William Whittaker, driving his 
Nash automobile, came upon the Units 1, 2 and 3 as 
they were so parked; he slowed to pass No. 1 and 
admits that Unit had its clearance lights on. (R. 
134). He pulled up and stopped behind No. 2 ( R. 
135-137); he was "straddling his rear duals." (R. 
141). Howard E. Cooper, Trooper, Utah Highway 
Patrol, was asked : 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not there \vas roorn between the left hand 
side of any one of the vehicles, the three trucks 
that we have been talking about, and the 
center lane for a passenger car to have moved 
without going over the center line? 
He answered: 
A. I think so. 
Q. And what is the opinion? 
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A. I think they could pass. 
(R. 235). 
The Nash was further towards the center line 
of the highway than Uni't No. 2 behind which he 
was stopped; its driver testified: 
A. I was right behind his rear duals on 
the left side which would be towards the 
middle line. I was straddling his rear duals. 
I had approximately my fenders and part of 
the windshield looking right up the side of 
his truck. ( R. 141). 
Nancy Dillingham, then a single girl of 16 
years ( R. 255), was driving the Chevrolet pickup 
truck; she drove the pickup past Unit No. 1 and 
rammed into the rear of the Nash. (R. 251-261). 
The Chevrolet pickup laid down only eight feet of 
skid marks from the left front tire (R. 226); it 
knocked the strenuously 'braked Nash automobile 
(R. 145) 10 feet into the rear of Unit No. 2 (R. 
226). 
The weather was clear and the road was dry. 
( R. 222). Nancy Dillingham and her present hus-
band, Keith Olsen, had been rabbit hunting with 
four other couples on the night of the accident. (R. 
241) ; there were three cars in the hunting party, 
the driver of one of these cars testified that he could 
see the parked Unit No. 1 and its lights from its 
rear when he was one thousand feet from it. ( R. 
243). 
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ARGUMENT 
Your appellants' rely upon error in the instruc-
tions and upon 'the 'trial court's refusal to give 
certain requested instructions. We shall examine 
first the instructions complained of as given. 
Instruction No. 27. 
You are instructed that the driver of the 
pickup 'truck was negligent as a matter of 
law, and if you find that she observed the 
hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles upon 
the highway or under the circumstances 
should have observed said vehicles, but be-
cause of her negligence failed to do so in time 
to a void said accident, then you are instructed 
that the negligence on her part was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision, and your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
(R. 103). 
Appellant cites no authority for his objection 
to this instruction bu't claims that the instruction 
constituted a directed verdict against appellants. 
The instruction informs the jury that Nancy Dil-
linghan1 vvas negligent as a matter of law [as deter-
mined at pretrial] and goes on to instruct the jury 
that: 
If you find that she observed the hazards 
* * * or under the circumstances should have 
observed but * * * failed to do so * * * then 
* * * the negligence on her part was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision * * * 
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That is sound law. In Hillyard v. Utah By· 
Products Co., 1 U. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, this Court 
wrote: 
In applying the test of foreseeability to 
situations where a negligently created pre-
existing condition combines 'vith a later act 
of negligence causing an injury, the courts 
have drawn a clear-cut distinction between 
two classes of cases. The first situation is 
where one has negligently created a danger-
ous condition [such as par king the truck] 
and a later actor observed, or circumstances 
are such that he could not fail to observe, 
but negligently failed to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later inter-
vening actor who negligently failed to ob-
serve the dangerous condition until it is too 
late to avoid it. In regard to the first situa-
tion it is held as a matter of la-w that the 
later intervening act does interrupt the na-
tural sequence of events and cut off the legal 
effect of the negligence of the initial actor. 
This is based upon the reasoning that it is 
not reasonably 'to be foreseen nor expected 
that one who actually becomes cognizant of 
a dangerous condition in ample time to avert 
injury will fail to do so. On the other hand, 
with respect to the second situation, where 
the second actor fails to see the danger in 
time to avoid it, it is held that a jury question 
exists, based on the rationale that it can reas-
onably be anticipated that circumstances may 
arise wherein others n1ay not observe the 
dangerous condition until too late to escape 
it. The distinction is basically one between a 
situation in which the second actor has suf-
10 
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ficient tin1e, after being charged with knowl-
edge of the hazard, to avoid it, and one in 
which the second actor negligently becomes 
confronted with an emergency situation. 
It was neither claimed nor proven,in this cause, 
that Nancy Dillingham was confronted with an 
emergency situation - therefore the issue went to 
the jury under this complained of instruction 
as to whether or not she observed the hazard or 
should have observed the hazard and failed to do so 
so as to make her negligence the sole proximate 
cause of the collision. Instruction No. 27 becomes 
free from doubt when read in conjunction with In-
struction No. 14 as given. Instruction No. 14 reads: 
The terms "negligence", "ordinary care", 
and "proximate cause", as used in 'these in-
structions, are defined as follows: 
a. "Negligence" means the failure to 
do what a reasonably prudent person would 
have done under 'the circumstances of the 
situation, or doing what such person under 
such existing ci:rcun1stances would not have 
done. The essence of the fault may He in act-
ing or omitting to act. The duty is dictated 
and measured by the exigencies of the occa-
sion; 
b. "'Ordinary care" is 'that degree of 
care which a reasonably prudent person vvould 
use under the same or similar circumstances. 
"Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reas-
onable diligence and such watchfulness, cau-
tion and foresight as under all the circum-
stances of the particular case would 'be exer-
11 
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cised by a reasonably careful, prudent person ; 
c. By "proximate cause" is meant that 
cause which is a natural, continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produced the 
injury and without which the injury would 
not have occurred. (R. 89). 
And Instruction No. 15 reads: 
With respect to the matter of proximate 
cause, referred to in 'the foregoing Instruc-
tion No. 14, if you find that the said accident 
would have happened \v'hether or not the de-
fendent H. E. Woolf stopped and parked his 
truck where he did, your verdict should be in 
favor of defendants Woolf and North Ameri-
can Van Lines, no cause of action. 
Similarly if you find that the said accident 
would have happened whether or not the de-
fendant Alvin Underwood stopped and parked 
his 'truck where he did, your verdict should 
be in favor of defendants Underwood and 
Johnson, no cause of action. 
To be able to so find, however, you must 
also find that in stopping and parking as they 
did, said drivers reasonably could not have 
foreseen that stopping and parking as they 
did, combined with the subsequent events that 
did take place, would result in the accident 
and injuries complained of. ( R. 90) . 
It is fundamental that: 
* * * a proper charge to a jury 1nay en-
tail quite a number of instructions, the fram-
ing of which in language meaningful to lay-
men and consistent with legal precepts poses 
such a problem that losing counsel can usually 
find some fla,vs or inconsistencies to form a 
1~ 
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basis for a plausible argument that the 
jury were misdirected. Due allowances 
must be made for this fact and the instruc-
tions must be considered altogether and 
viewed with tolerance and understanding to 
see whether the basic issues were fairly 
and intelligibly presented for determina-
tion. If that purpose is accomplished, that 
is all that is necessary, and no verdict 
should be nullified for minor errors or 
inconsistencies in the instructions. * * * 
Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
~Co., 6 U. 2d 159, 307 P. 2d 1045, 1047. 
Appellant complains also of the Court's 
Instruction No. 23; it reads: 
You are instructed that the evidence 
is undisputed that the defendants stopped 
to render assistance to the driver of 
Truck No. 1 and in this connection you 
are further instructed that they were under 
no duty to place lighted flares around 
their vehicles. {R. 99). 
Sec. 41-6-153, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
states in substance that the driver of a dis-
abled vehicle must place flares or other warning 
devices on the highway during the hours of dark-
ness. 
The legislative intent seems clear that 
this section applies only to vehicles which have 
13. 
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become disabled. Certainly the legislature did 
not intend to require a vehicle making a temporary 
stop to put out flares, particularly when all 
of its lights were on_ including flashing lights 
in the rear, which was undisputed in this in-
&tance. Alvin Underwood's first concern was to 
assist the disabled truck. Upon learning that the 
lighting difficulty was minor, he repaired it in 
less time than would have been required to place 
flares. When the accident occurred repairs had 
been completed, and the truck drivers were on 
their way back to get into their trucks and leave 
the scene. Would not the situation have been 
the same if flares had been placed at the time 
the collision occurred? They would have been 
gathered up, preparatory to leaving. The issue 
of whether flares should have been used seems 
immaterial when the evidence is undisputed that 
Nancy Dillingham did see "a bunch of lights from 
further down the road, and as I came closer, I 
thought that unit was moving." (R. 252). Cer-
13a. 
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tainly, this was notice sufficient to require 
her to have her vehicle under control so that she 
could avoid a collision with the Whittaker car, 
which was there to be seen, had she been looking. 
Even if there had been a violation of the 
Utah traffic law by defendants, such was not a 
proximate cause of the collision. 
13b 
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basis for a plausible argument that the jury 
were misdirected. Due allowances must be 
1nade for this fact and the instructions must 
be considered altogether and viewed with tol-
erance and understanding to see whether the 
basic issues were fairly and intelligibly pre-
sented for determination. If that purpose is 
accomplished, that is all that is necessary, 
and no verdict should be nullified for minor 
errors or inconsistencies in the instructions. 
* * * 
Heywood v. Denver and Rio Grande Western 
R. Co., 6 U. 2d 159, 307 P. 2d 1045, 1047. 
Appellant complains also of the Court's In-
struction No. 23; it reads: 
You are instructed that the evidence is 
undisputed that the defendants stopped to 
render assistance to the driver of Truck No. 
1 and in this connection you are further in-
structed that they were under no duty to 
place lighted flares around their vehicles. 
(R. 99). 
We concede that the violation of a traffic law 
constitutes negligence as a matter of law, but, as 
this Court has said : 
~ .. -__ 
We have said that violation of a traffic 
law constitutes negligence as a matter of law, 
but that such violation may not be the proxi-
mate cause of an injury. Without determin-
ing the correctness of the trial court's inter-
pretation of the statute as applicable to the 
facts here, we believe in error the ruling that 
the driver's negligence, if any, because of 
violation of the statute * * *,was a proximate 
cause of the injury. 
13 
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Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 U. 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 
796; Gibbs v. Blue Orob Co., 122 U. 312, 249 P. 2d 
213; On Rehearing, 123 U. 281, 259 P. 2d 294. The 
rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission may 
well have the force of statute, however, the same 
rule of law would be applicable thereto and we do 
not here concern ourselves with appellants' con-
tentions for I.C.C. rules since that issue was not 
raised during the trial of this cause. 
Next appellant com plains of the trial court's 
refusal to give appellants' requested instructions 
Nos. 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20 21, 34 and 35. 
By refusing to give these requested instructions the 
Court below did not err if the instructions as given 
by the Court enabled the jury to correctly under-
stand the issues. We submit that the instructions 
given when considered each in the light of the other 
and altogether correctly apprised the jury of the 
law and issues in this cause. Prejudicial error would 
have undoubtedly occurred had the Court given the 
requested instructions of appellant for at least three 
reasons: 1st: The requested instructions place un-
due emphasis on applicable laws favorable to appel-
lants' side. Shields v. Utah Light and Ttaction Co., 
99 U. 507, 105 P. 2d 347; 2nd: Continual reference 
and repeating of certain law propositions (flares, 
parking, etc.) would result in the unbalancing of 
the charge to the jury. Devine v. Cook, 3 U. 2d 134, 
1.! 
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279 P. 1073; 3rd: The requested instructions were 
inconsistent with the evidence as to the proximate 
cause of the accident- the jury undoubtedly found, 
as it well could, that the negligence of Nancy Dil-
lingham ( 0 lsen) was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision. 
Finally, appellant com plains of the trial court's 
refusal to give appellants' instruction No. 1. Tha't 
requested instruction reads: 
Defendants, Alvin Underwood, Joseph 
Johnson, H. E. Woolf, and the North Ameri-
can Van Lines, were required to park off the 
traveled portion of the highway if it is prac-
ticable. The word, "practicable" is not syn-
onymous with convenient and the circum-
stances of the case are con trolling and are to 
be considered by you. The failure on the part 
of the defendants to exercise due care under 
the circru1nstances in this respect requires you 
to find them negligent and to award damages 
against them. (Emphasis ours). (R. 40). 
The violation of a traffic statute as hereinabove 
pointed out \Vas not and could not be determinative 
of the proxin1ate cause of the injury - the issue, 
determinable under the facts, for the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the evidence amply supports 
the finding of the jury of "No Cause of Action" 
against respondents Alvin Underwood and Joseph 
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Johnson; that the evidence conclusively shows that 
your appellant William Whittaker parked improper-
ly behind Unit No. 2 (by being closer to the center 
line of the highway and further obstructing the 
roadway) and 'that William Whittaker could have 
in all safety driven on without stopping; that the 
negligence of Nancy Dillingham (Olsen) was the 
sole proximate cause of the collision. 
The verdict of the jury should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, U'tah 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Alvin Underwood 
and Joseph Johnson. 
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